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Abstract. Some image encryption systems based on modified double 
random phase encoding and joint transform correlator architecture 
produce low quality decrypted images and are vulnerable to a variety of 
attacks. In this work, we analyse the algorithm of some reported methods 
that optically implement the double random phase encryption in a joint 
transform correlator. We show that it is possible to significantly improve 
the quality of the decrypted image by introducing a simple nonlinear 
operation in the encrypted function that contains the joint power 
spectrum. This nonlinearity also makes the system more resistant to 
chosen-plaintext attacks. We additionally explore the system resistance 
against this type of attacks when a variety of probability density 
functions are used to generate the two random phase masks of the 
encryption-decryption process. Numerical results are presented and 
discussed. 
Keywords: Image encryption, decryption, Joint transform correlator, 
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1. Introduction 
Optical encryption technology is useful for security applications as it is proved by the 
intense research developed in the field in the last two decades. Significant progress in 
optoelectronic devices has made optical technologies attractive for security [1].  
 
A pioneer optical encryption system, named double random phase encoding (DRPE), 
was proposed by Réfrégier and Javidi [2]. The optical hardware initially proposed to 
perform DRPE was the classical 4f-processor [3]. This processor typically requires strict 
optical alignment, which in practice is difficult to attain. To alleviate this constraint, 
Nomura and Javidi proposed a technique for optical DRPE using joint transform 
correlator (JTC) architecture that also showed other advantages [4]. With JTC, a 
common power-law sensor (such as CCD) captures the intensity distribution of the joint 
power spectrum (JPS) as the encrypted data, while the classical DRPE method requires 
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the recording of complex-valued information. An additional advantage of JTC is that 
the decryption process utilizes the same security key previously used in the encryption 
process, which eliminates the need to produce an exact complex conjugate of the key. 
Two non-overlapping data distributions are placed side-by-side at the input plane of the 
JTC that can be mathematically expressed by the addition of two terms, i. e. 
 A x( )!" (x # a)+ B x( )!" (x + a) , written in one-dimensional notation for the sake of 
simplicity. The first random phase mask (RPM-I) r(x)  is bonded to the image to be 
encrypted f (x)  and both are placed together at coordinate x = a , so that 
 A x( ) = r(x) f (x) . The inverse Fourier transform of the second random phase mask 
(RPM-II) h x( )  is placed at coordinate x = !a , so that  B x( ) = FT
!1 h(u){ } , where FT!1  
denotes inverse Fourier transform and variable u  the spatial frequency coordinate. The 
random phase distributions r x( )  and h x( )  are statistically independent, purely phase 
data of the form k x( ) = exp i2!"k x( ){ } , where !k x( )  is a normalized positive function 
randomly generated and uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Nomura and Javidi 
introduced the term “key code” for the inverse Fourier transform of the RPM-II in [4], 
which is generally fully complex-valued, with both amplitude and phase being variant 
magnitudes. Such an arrangement of the information in the JTC was mathematically 
equivalent to the DRPE proposed in [2]. Due to the difficulties encountered to display 
complex-valued functions on the spatial light modulators (SLMs) available at the time 
Ref. [4] was published, Nomura and Javidi used the optical Fourier transform of a RPM, 
i. e.  FT h(u){ } , as the key code. In their optical implementation [4], they split in two 
beams the optical entrance of the setup, all what became more complex and required 
finer alignment than a conventional JTC. This difficulty was alleviated in [5] with the 
adoption of real-valued data for the key code  FT
!1 h(u){ } . This key code was designed 
using an algorithm so that its Fourier transform has a uniform amplitude distribution 
and a uniformly random phase distribution. An amplitude only SLM can be used to 
display the real-valued key code  FT
!1 h(u){ }  and the image to encrypt f (x)  side-by-side 
in the input plane of a conventional JTC setup to implement DRPE. In such a case, 
RPM-I is bonded to the part of the SLM where f (x)  is displayed [5].    
  
Other modifications in DRPE implemented by JTC have been proposed by several 
authors [6-11]. Reference [6] gathers other optical encryption systems based on the JTC 
architecture. Among them, Islam and Alam [7] proposed a two-channel shifted-phase 
encoded JTC that eliminates the central orders in the JTC output plane, which results in 
a quality improvement of the decrypted image. However, the encrypted function 
resulting from the proposed method is a complex-valued distribution and cannot be 
captured by a conventional camera, therefore making the optical implementation more 
complicated in practice. Other contributions closer to the original JTC architecture and 
to our work are found in [8-10]. They substitute the complex-valued key code 
 FT
!1 h(u){ }  by the very RPM-II, that is, they take  B x( ) = h(x)  in the input plane of the 
JTC. Although this does not reproduce exactly the DRPE algorithm as proposed in [2], 
this modified JTC-based encryption system becomes easier to implement with the help 
of a simple full size diffuser glass (random phase element) placed in the input plane. On 
the one part of the JTC input plane, a zone of the diffuser (RPM-I) is against the image 
to be encrypted and, laterally shifted from it, another zone of the diffuser (RPM-II) is 
used on the other part. The latter RPM-II constitutes the security key used in both the 
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encryption and the decryption stages. Thus, whereas the RPM-II used as key in the 
original DRPE algorithm acts in the Fourier domain [2], it acts in the spatial domain in 
the modified DRPE algorithm [8-10]. This main difference between both proposals has 
a significant influence on the quality of the decrypted image, as we will show in this 
paper. 
 
In [11] another modification of the setup is proposed. The diffuser acting as RPM is 
moved to a different plane, so that its Fourier transform is obtained in the input plane of 
the JTC. In this case  A x( ) = f (x)FT r(u){ }  and  B x( ) = FT h(u){ } . Note that, neither the 
modification described in [8-10] nor the second modification introduced in [11], exactly 
reproduce the mathematics of the original DRPE algorithm [2] implemented in a JTC 
[4]. 
 
The optical encryption methods proposed in [8-10] are vulnerable to plaintext attacks 
[12, 13]. In cryptanalysis, it is always assumed that attackers already know the 
encryption process and other resources, such as a pair consisting of an original image 
and its encrypted image, and that the attackers are trying to determine the security key. 
In chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), for instance, the attacker introduces an adequate input 
image (skillfully designed chosen plaintext) in the encryption [14] or decryption [15] 
process, and they get the corresponding output image in order to deduce the security 
key. 
 
In this work, we analyse the algorithm of the method reported in [8-10] that optically 
implements the modified DRPE in a JTC. We show that it is possible to significantly 
improve the quality of the decrypted image by introducing a simple nonlinear operation 
in the encrypted function that contains the JPS. This nonlinearity consists of dividing 
the JPS by the square magnitude of the Fourier transform of the RPM-II. With this 
nonlinearity the encryption JTC system approaches better the implementation of the 
DRPE as it was originally proposed in [2]. There is no need to make the optical setup 
more complicated because a conventional JTC is sufficient for the implementation of 
the whole process. This nonlinearity also makes the system more resistant to CPAs. We 
additionally explore the system resistance against this type of attacks when a variety of 
probability density functions are used to generate the two RPMs of the encryption-
decryption process. The proposed nonlinear-modified encryption method still benefits 
from the easier optical implementation of contributions [8-10] and, in addition to this, it 
keeps the same amount of information to be transmitted since the resulting encrypted 
function has the same size as its original counterpart and only requires one key for 
decryption.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides the mathematical 
background of the modified DRPE implemented in JTC architecture [8-10]. In Section 
3, the proposed nonlinearity is introduced in the encrypted function and its effects on 
the decrypted image quality and on the system resistance against CPAs are analysed. 
Numerical experiments are designed to illustrate the proposal. The results presented and 
discussed lead to outline the conclusions in Section 4. 
 4 
2. Image encryption system based on the JTC 
Let f(x) be the real image to be encrypted with values in the interval [0, 1], r(x) and h(x) 
be two RPMs given by 
 r(x) = exp i2!m(x){ }, h(x) = exp i2!n(x){ },                            (1) 
where m(x) and n(x) are normalized positive functions randomly generated, statistically 
independent and uniformly distributed in the interval [0, 1]. Figure 1 shows the optical 
encrypting scheme based on a JTC architecture (via 1), and the optical decrypting 
scheme based on a 4f-processor. In the encryption process, the RPM-I r(x) is placed on 
the real image f(x) and then, the product r(x)f(x) and the RPM-II h(x) are placed side by 
side in the input plane of JTC at coordinates x = a and x = –a, respectively [8]. The JPS, 
also named the encrypted power spectrum e(u), is given by 
 
e(u) = JPS(u) = FT r(x) f (x){ }!" (x # a)+ h(x)!" (x + a)$% &'
2
= F(u)!R(u) 2 + H (u) 2
+ F(u)!R(u)$% &'
!
H (u)ei2( (2a)u + F(u)!R(u)$% &'H !(u)e# i2( (2a)u ,
     (2) 
where the functions represented by capital letters correspond to the FTs from functions 
represented in lowercase letters, the symbol (!) indicates the convolution operation and 
the superscript * denotes the complex conjugation operation. Equation (2) demonstrates 
that the encrypted image is real, and thus, it can be registered and stored by a 
conventional intensity capture device, such as a CCD camera. The security key is 
represented by the RPM-II h(x) and the RPM-I r(x) is used to spread the information 
content of the original image f(x) onto the encrypted image e(u). 
 
In the decryption process (Figure 1), the RPM-II h(x) is placed at coordinate x = –a  
in the input plane of a 4f-processor [8], and, consequently, in the Fourier plane, the 
encrypted power spectrum e(u) is illuminated by H(u)exp[i2πau]. The resulting product 
is given by 
 
g(u) = e(u)H (u)ei2!au = F(u)"R(u) 2 H (u)ei2!au + H (u) 2 H (u)ei2!au
+ F(u)"R(u)#$ %&
"
H 2 (u)ei2! (3a)u + F(u)"R(u)#$ %&H "(u)H (u)e' i2!au .
    (3) 
The fourth term of equation (3) is the most interesting term since it retains the 
information to be decrypted [8]. Therefore, when the inverse FT is applied to the fourth 
term of equation (3) we obtain 
 
d(x) = FT-1 F(u)!R(u)"# $%H !(u)H (u)e& i2'au{ } = r(x) f (x)! h(x)( h(x){ }!) (x & a),      (4) 
where the symbol  (!)  indicates the correlation operation. Although RPM-I r(x) is a 
phase-only function, the intensity distribution of d(x) centered at coordinate x = a would 
not longer be the intensity of the original image function f(x) as it was obtained for the 
decrypted image in [2, 4]. Note that in equation (4) the product r(x)f(x) appears 
convolved by the complex-valued autocorrelation of the RPM-II h(x). The more this 
autocorrelation approaches a Dirac delta function (i.e,  h(x)! h(x) " # (x) ) [8], the more 
the intensity distribution captured at x = a resembles the original image intensity 
 f (x)
2
. 
 
The simulation results of the encryption and decryption processes following the steps 
described above, are shown in Figure 2. The image to be encrypted (original image) is 
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presented in Figure 2(a). The random distribution code n(x) of RPM-II h(x) is shown in 
Figure 2(b). The encrypted image is depicted in Figure 2(c). The decrypted image is 
shown in Figure 2(e), which depicts the magnified region of interest of the output plane 
(Fig. 2d). Note the difference between the decrypted image of Fig. 2(e), which has been 
obtained through the whole process represented by equations (1) to (4), and the image 
of Fig. 2(f) that has been obtained by calculating just the right term of equation (4) and 
taking the absolute value (i.e. 
 
r(x) f (x)! h(x)" h(x){ } ). The autocorrelation of RPM-II 
h(x) is shown in Figure 2(g) to 2(i): Figure 2(g) represents the absolute value 
 h(x)! h(x)  in logarithmic scale, Figure 2(h) the phase  h(x)! h(x){ } h(x)! h(x) coded 
in gray levels, and Figure 2(i) is a truncated linear representation of the absolute value 
 h(x)! h(x) . To evaluate the quality of the decrypted image, we use the root mean 
square error (RMSE) defined by [16] 
 
RMSE =
f (x)! d(x)"# $%
2
x=1
M
&
f (x)"# $%
2
x=1
M
&
'
(
)
)
)
)
*
+
,
,
,
,
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2
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where f(x) and d(x) denote the original image and the decrypted image, respectively. 
The RMSE between the original image of Figure 2(a) and the decrypted image of 
Figure 2(e) is 0.687, and 0.505 if it is compared with the decrypted image of Figure 
2(f). This value confirms the poor quality of the decrypted image as a consequence of 
the fact that the autocorrelation of RPM-II h(x) is not purely a Dirac delta function. The 
autocorrelation of RPM-II h(x) usually has a noisy background (Figure 2(g) to 2(i)) that 
may significantly affect the quality of the decrypted image. 
2.1. Chosen-plaintext attack applied to the encryption system based on a JTC 
According to [12], a CPA can reconstruct the FT of the security key, RPM-II h(x). To 
obtain the FT of the RPM-II h(x), this attack introduces a couple of chosen plaintexts in 
the encryption system. The first chosen plaintext and its corresponding encrypted image 
are  
                                            f1(x) = 0, e1(u) = H (u)
2
.                                               (6) 
Therefore, when a null image is introduced in the encryption system, the square 
modulus of the FT of the security key is obtained. The second chosen plaintext is a 
shifted Dirac delta function, and its corresponding encrypted image is 
  
 
f2 (x) = ! (x " xp ), e2 (u) = 1+ H (u)
2
+ 2 H (u) cos 2# $(u)" m(xp )+ (2a + xp )u%& '({ },     (7) 
where φ(u) is the phase of H(u) and m(xp) represents a constant value. The argument of 
the cosine function in equation (7) is mainly related to φ(u) with some additional phase 
terms. Provided |H(u)| is obtained from equation (6), the phase of H(u) can be retrieved 
from equation (7) by following a phase-shifting procedure similar to the one indicated 
in [12]. 
 
Therefore, after the two chosen plaintexts represented by the equations (6)-(7) are 
introduced into the encryption system, the attacker can have access to the complete 
complex information of the FT of the security key. Thus the encryption system based on 
JTC presented in the section 2 is vulnerable to the CPA [12]. 
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3. Nonlinear modification of the JTC architecture 
The analysis of the JTC-based encryption system carried out in the previous section, in 
terms of both the low quality of the decrypted image and the vulnerability to CPA, leads 
us to propose a nonlinear modification of the encryption step to overcome these 
drawbacks. We propose to introduce a nonlinearity that consists of dividing the JPS by 
|H(u)|2. Thus, the nonlinearly modified encrypted information becomes 
        
 
eN (u) =
JPS(u)
H (u)
2 =
F(u)!R(u) 2
H (u)
2 +1+ F(u)!R(u)"# $%
! H (u)
H (u)
2 e
i2& (2a)u
+ F(u)!R(u)"# $%
H !(u)
H (u)
2 e
' i2& (2a)u .
                 (8) 
If |H(u)|2 is equal to zero for a particular value of u, this intensity value is substituted by 
a small constant to avoid singularities when computing  eN (u) . Equation (8) represents 
the new encrypted image when the JPS is nonlinearly modified. Figure 1, which 
corresponds to the encrypting and decrypting schemes based on a JTC architecture, also 
shows the nonlinear modification of this new proposal (via 2). 
 
In the decryption process (Figure 1), the product between the encrypted image (now 
represented by equation (8)) and the FT of the RPM-II h(x + a) is given by 
 
gN (u) = eN (u)H (u)e
i2!au = F(u)"R(u) 2 H (u)
H (u)
2 e
i2!au + H (u)ei2!au
+ F(u)"R(u)#$ %&
" H 2 (u)
H (u)
2 e
i2! (3a)u + F(u)"R(u)#$ %&
H "(u)H (u)
H (u)
2 e
' i2!au .
   (9) 
When the inverse FT is applied to the simplified fourth term of equation (9), the 
obtained decrypted distribution is  
 
dN (x) = FT
-1 F(u)!R(u)"# $%e& i2'au{ } = r(x) f (x)!( (x & a).                    (10) 
The intensity of equation (10) produces the original image intensity  f (x)
2
at 
coordinate x = a. Unlike equation (4), we remark that equation (10) does not have the 
autocorrelation term of the RPM-II h(x), therefore a higher quality decrypted image is 
expected. It is worth mentioning that the proposed nonlinearity allows the whole system 
to closer approach the output result of DRPE as it was originally formulated by 
Réfrégier and Javidi in reference [2]. 
 
The simulation results of the nonlinearly modified encryption scheme are shown in 
Figure 3. The original image to be encrypted is depicted in Figure 3(a). The encrypted 
and decrypted images are shown in Figure 3(b) and 3(c), respectively. The RMSE 
between the original image from Figure 3(a) and the decrypted image from Figure 3(c) 
is 0.061. According to this parameter, the quality of the decrypted image shown in 
Figure 3(c) has greatly improved in comparison to the decrypted image displayed in 
Figure 2(e) or 2(f). This fact is mainly due to the removal of the autocorrelation term 
from the decrypted signal (see equations (4) and (10)).  
 
The nonlinear modification of the JPS can be implemented using the optoelectronic 
setup of Figure 1 (JTC part) by following the procedure proposed in references [17-19]. 
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The encrypted image given by equation (8) can be optically implemented by a two-step 
JTC [17-18]. In the first step, the power spectrum of the security key (|H(u)|2) is 
captured. Then, the JPS of equation (2) is captured in the second step [19]. Finally, the 
JPS is digitally divided by |H(u)|2, and thus, the encrypted image is computed. This 
encrypted distribution, along with the key, is the only information to be transmitted; 
therefore, this method does not increment the amount of data to be sent prior to the 
decryption stage.  
3.1. Chosen-plaintext attack applied to the nonlinear JTC-based encryption system 
In this section we test the resistance of the proposed nonlinear encryption system 
against CPA. According to equation (8), if a null image  f1(x) = 0  is introduced in the 
encryption system, the encrypted distribution will be  
                                   eN1(u) = 1.                                                              (11) 
Unlike the classical JTC (via 1 of Figure 1), it will not be possible to obtain any 
information about the RPM-II h(x) from the encrypted image given by equation (11). 
The second chosen plaintext uses a shifted Dirac delta function 
 
f2(x) = ! (x " xp )  at the 
input plane of the nonlinear JTC. The corresponding encrypted image using equation (8) 
is 
 
eN 2 (u) =
1
H (u)
2 +1+
2
H (u)
cos 2! "(u)# m(xp )+ (2a + xp )u$% &'{ },                (12) 
where both the modulus and phase functions of H(u) will be unknown. Therefore, these 
chosen-plaintext attacks will not allow the attacker to easily obtain any information 
about neither h(x) nor H(u). 
 
However, some methods to extract the phase information [20-22] could be used to 
retrieve partial information of the security key h(x). For this reason we analyse in the 
following subsection the relevance of the magnitude and phase information of the FT of 
h(x) in the decryption step.  
3.2. Security tests depending on RPMs features 
The security of the proposed nonlinear JTC-based encryption system is further analysed 
in this section. The effects of knowing partial information of the security key in the 
decryption step are evaluated. To this end, different types of random distributions are 
considered to generate the RPMs. For the different cases studied in this section, the 
original image to be encrypted is represented by Figure 3(a), its corresponding 
encrypted image is calculated by using equation (8), and the modulus and phase of the 
FT of the security key H(u) are denoted by |H(u)| and φ(u), respectively. 
 
The first case of study considers uniform random distributions so that all gray levels 
have the same probability [16]. For example, images shown in Figure 4(a) and 4(b) 
depict m(x) and n(x) with the named Uniform and Beta random distributions, 
respectively. These random codes were used to obtain the encrypted image of Figure 
3(b). Figure 4(c) and 4(d) show the histograms of m(x) and n(x), respectively, which 
reveal the relative uniformity of the probability density function of these codes. 
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In a first experiment, we perform the decryption process using only the information 
|H(u)| from H(u) and we assume that φ(u) = 0. The decrypted image |dN3(x)| for this case 
is shown in Figure 4(e), where the original image cannot be made out from the noisy 
background. In a second experiment, we perform again the decryption process but using 
only the phase of H(u) and we consider that |H(u)| = 1. The corresponding decrypted 
image |dN4(x)| for this case is presented in Figure 4(f). In this case, the original image 
can be distinguished from the noisy background even though its quality is much lower 
(RMSE = 0.704). The results of the decrypted images of Figures 4(e) and 4(f) indicate 
that the information of φ(u) is more relevant in the decryption process than the 
information of |H(u)|, whenever m(x) and n(x) use uniform random distributions. 
 
In the second case of study, non-uniform random distributions are used to generate 
the RPMs [16]. In particular, Weibull and Chi-Square random distributions are 
considered to generate m(x) and n(x), respectively. These images of random 
distributions codes are shown in Figure 5(a) and 5(b) and their histograms are depicted 
in Figures 5(c) and 5(d), respectively. Using the original image f(x), m(x) in RPM-I, n(x) 
in RPM-II and the equation (8), the encrypted image eN5(u) is obtained and shown in 
Figure 5(e). For the decryption process, let us consider the full information of φ(u) (with 
|H(u)| = 1), which has been shown to be the most relevant piece of information if only 
partial data of the FT of the security key is available. The corresponding decrypted 
image |dN5(x)| is shown in Figure 5(f). This result demonstrates that the retrieval of the 
original image is much harder when m(x) and n(x) are generated by non-uniform 
random distributions. We repeat the latter experiment for different combinations of 
random distributions (Uniform, Weibull and Chi-Square) to generate m(x) and n(x) in 
the encryption-decryption process. Figure 6(a) shows the decrypted image when we 
swap the random distributions of Figure 5, that is, when m(x) and n(x) are given by Chi-
Square and Weibull random distributions, respectively. In Figure 6(a), the original 
image can be identified although with some difficulty. The result is clearly different 
from Figure 5(f), hence the encryption-decryption scheme proposed in this work is 
asymmetric with respect to the role played by random distributions used for the RPMs. 
Images in Figure 6(b)-6(e) correspond to the decryption images when m(x) is generated 
by a Uniform random distribution and n(x) by a non-uniform random distribution (either 
Chi-Square or Weibull), and vice versa. If we use a Uniform random distribution for 
n(x), the decrypted images showed in Figure 6(c) and 6(d) can be visualized more easily 
than the decrypted images of Figure 6(b) and 6(e) that use a non-uniform random 
distribution for n(x). Therefore, in order to better protect the secret of the encrypted 
image we recommend to use non-uniform random distributions for n(x), which is the 
random code associated to the security key RPM-II h(x). 
 
Finally, in the third case of study, we consider a more realistic case, for which φ(u) is 
not available, but it has to be estimated from equation (12) by taking |H(u)| = 1 and 
assuming a chosen-plaintext attack represented by a Dirac delta function 
 
f6(x) = ! (x " xp ) . In such a case the encrypted image is 
  
 
eN 6 (u) = 2 1+ cos 2! "(u)# m(xp )+ (2a + xp )u$% &'{ }$% &'.                        (13) 
In order to eliminate the ambiguities of the cosine function when its argument is 
evaluated from equation (13), a new chosen plaintext represented by a shifted Dirac 
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delta function 
 
f7 (x) = ! (x " xp )ei#  with a phase value (ϕ < π/2) is introduced in the 
encryption system. The result for the encrypted image with |H(u)| = 1 is 
 
eN 7 (u) = 2 1+ cos 2! "(u)# m(xp )+ (2a + xp )u$% &' #({ }$% &'.                    (14) 
Giving different values to the phase difference ϕ introduced in equation (14), for 
instance, using phase-shifting interferometry [23, 24], it is possible to suppress the 
ambiguity given by the sign of the cosine function in equation (13). This interferometry 
method is described in detail in reference [12]. Once determined, the argument of the 
cosine function of equation (13) without ambiguities, it permits to obtain φ(u), the phase 
of H(u). 
 
Then, the phase of H(u) estimated by the equations (13)-(14) can be used in the 
decryption process (we assume that |H(u)| = 1) with different random distributions for 
m(x) and n(x). When either the uniform random distributions (Figure 4(a) and 4(b)) or 
non-uniform random distributions (Figure 5(a) and 5(b)) are used to generate m(x) and 
n(x), the respective decrypted images |dN8(x)| (Figure 7(a)) or |dN9(x)| (Figure 7(b)) are 
obtained, respectively. Images in Figure 7 are noisy and the original image cannot be 
identified. The results shown in Figure 7 prove that the retrieval of the original image is 
not possible when the security key h(x) is estimated through the equations (13-14), 
regardless what random distribution has been used for m(x) and n(x) within Uniform, 
Beta, Weibull and Chi-Square. 
 
For the sake of comparison of the cases of study provided in this work, table 1 
contains a summary of all the results obtained so far. 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented an image encryption system based on a nonlinear joint 
transform correlator architecture. The nonlinear modification, introduced in the Fourier 
domain, has improved the quality of the decrypted image with respect to other previous 
works based on a modified DRPE algorithm implemented by JTC. Since the proposed 
modification is applied to the JPS, just before the generation of the encrypted image, 
there is no additional burden in the transmitted data. In addition, using the nonlinear 
term introduced into the JPS, it permits an improvement in the security of the encrypted 
image. Due to this, the encrypted image is robust against chosen-plaintext attacks. 
Concerning the RPMs features, the most relevant piece of information in the decryption 
process is the phase of the Fourier transform of the RPM-II provided the RPMs have 
been generated by uniform random distributions; the encryption-decryption scheme is 
asymmetric with respect to the random distributions used for the two RPMs, and the 
secret of the encrypted image is better protected when a non-uniform random 
distribution is used in the generation of RPM-II. Finally, the nonlinear encryption and 
the decryption processes are suitable for optoelectronic implementation in a two-step 
JTC and a 4f-processor, respectively. 
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List of figure captions  
 
Fig. 1. Scheme of the optical setup composed by an encryption system based on a JTC 
architecture (via 1 or via 2) and a decryption system based on a 4f-processor. 
 
Fig. 2. (a) Original image f(x) to be encrypted, (b) Random function n(x) of RPM-II 
h(x), (c) Encrypted image e(u), (d) Absolute value of the output plane obtained by 
computing the whole encryption/decryption process, (e) Magnified region of interest of 
(d) corresponding to the decrypted image |d(x)|, (f) Decrypted image obtained by 
calculating just the right term of equation (4) and taking the absolute value 
 
r(x) f (x)! h(x)" h(x){ } , and (g)-(i) Autocorrelation of h(x): (g) Absolute value 
 h(x)! h(x)  in logarithmic scale, (h) Phase  h(x)! h(x){ } h(x)! h(x) coded in gray 
levels, and (i) Truncated linear representation of the absolute value  h(x)! h(x) . 
 
Fig. 3. (a) Original image f(x) to be encrypted; results obtained when the JPS is 
nonlinearly modified: (b) Encrypted image eN(u), and (c) Decrypted image |dN(x)|. 
 
Fig. 4. (a)-(b) Random distributions: (a) Uniform for m(x), and (b) Beta for n(x).        
(c)-(d) Histograms of: (c) m(x), and (d) n(x). (e)-(f) Decrypted images: (e) |dN3(x)| using 
only the information of |H(u)| and taking φ(u) = 0, and (f) |dN4(x)| using only the phase 
of H(u) and taking |H(u)| = 1. 
 
Fig. 5. (a)-(b) Random distributions: (a) Weibull for m(x), and (b) Chi-Square for n(x).       
(c)-(d) Histograms of: (c) m(x), and (d) n(x). (e) Encrypted image eN5(u), and               
(f) Decrypted image |dN5(x)| using only the phase of H(u) and taking |H(u)| = 1. 
 
Fig. 6. Decrypted images with their respective RMSE generated when we use only the 
phase of H(u) and take |H(u)| = 1 and the following random distributions for m(x) and 
n(x), respectively: (a) Chi-Square and Weibull (for which the random distributions have 
been swapped with respect to Figure 5), (b) Uniform and Chi-Square, (c) Chi-Square 
and Uniform, (d) Weibull and Uniform, and (e) Uniform and Weibull. 
 
Fig. 7. Decrypted images |dN8(x)| and |dN9(x)| obtained in the third case of study when 
m(x) and n(x) are respectively represented by the following random distributions: (a) 
Uniform and Beta, and (b) Weibull and Chi-Square. 
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Table 1. Summary of the results obtained for the decrypted images in the experiments 
simulated in this work. 
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Table 1. 
 RPM-I 
m(x) 
RPM-II 
n(x) 
Available information 
of the key 
RMSE Figure 
Procedure according 
reference [8] 
Uniform Beta Full H(u) 0.687 2(e) 
Uniform Beta Full H(u) 0.505 2(f) 
Our proposal Uniform Beta Full H(u) 0.061 3(c) 
      
1st Case of study Uniform Beta |H(u)| 0.917 4(e) Uniform Beta φ(u) 0.704 4(f) 
2nd Case of study 
Weibull Chi-Square φ(u) 0.903 5(f) 
Chi-Square Weibull φ(u) 0.802 6(a) 
Uniform Chi-Square φ(u) 0.853 6(b) 
Chi-Square Uniform φ(u) 0.678 6(c) 
Weibull Uniform φ(u) 0.691 6(d) 
Uniform Weibull φ(u) 0.771 6(e) 
3rd Case of study (CPA) 
Uniform Beta Estimated φ(u) 0.957 7(a) 
Weibull Chi-Square Estimated φ(u) 0.935 7(b) 
 
